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Abstract
This paper investigates the presence of a network externality which might explain the per-
sistence of low schooling achievements among internal migrants. We test empirically whether
young migrants￿schooling decisions are a⁄ected by the presence of covillagers at destination,
using data on life-time histories of migration and education choices from a rural region of
Thailand. Di⁄erent modelling approaches are used to account for the self-selection of young
migrants, for potential endogeneity of the network size, and for unobserved heterogeneity
in individual preferences. The size of the migrant network is found to negatively a⁄ect the
propensity of young migrants to pursue schooling while in the city. This ￿nding suggests
that policies seeking to minimise strati￿cation in enclaves might have a socially multiplied
impact on schooling participation, and, ultimately, a⁄ect the socio-economic mobility of the
rural born.
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11 Introduction
"People in the city and people in the village aren￿ t the same. City people, Bangkok people, you
can￿ t trust them, they only think of themselves. In the city people don￿ t know each other. I￿ ve
lived in this room for many months now and I still don￿ t know the neighbors. In the village I
know everyone. We grow up together, we￿ re all relatives and friends together. I know where they
come from, their background. I can trust them." Daeng, a 20-year-old textile operative quoted
in Mills (1997)
Disparities in growth between urban and rural areas, as well as reduction in migration costs,
act as powerful pull factors augmenting the demographic pressures on overcrowded cities of
developing countries. It is tempting to assert that the access to more remunerative employment
opportunities in urban agglomerates increases the expected returns on education and therefore
acts as an incentive to invest in human capital for those planning to migrate. However, young
migrants take the decision to pursue schooling beyond a literacy level jointly with their family
and are in￿ uenced by the broader social network they belong to. It is increasingly recognized that
di⁄erences in the composition and exclusion mechanisms of these networks a⁄ect opportunity
costs of higher education.
Economic research on network e⁄ects and welfare of the migrant population has produced
contrasting results. One strand of the literature emphasizes that the reliance of migrants on
origin-speci￿c social capital can be associated with a lower rate of assimilation of destination-
speci￿c skills. Among others, Borjas (1995) has shown that ethnic neighborhoods have detri-
mental e⁄ects on the educational attainment of migrants in the US. A competing hypothesis
is that ethnic or origin-based concentration of migrants is a source of opportunities for gainful
interactions in the labor market, for example by disseminating information on job opportunities.
Banerjee (1983)￿ s research on rural-urban migration in India documents extensively the impor-
tance of networks of covillagers for explaining migration ￿ ows, success of initial job search, and
duration of urban employment. With evidence in support of both positive and negative e⁄ects,
it is unclear how segmentation along enclaves a⁄ects economic performance of migrants.
This paper tests the hypothesis that migrant networks might act as important externalities
in the education process of young migrants, representing a potential determinant of the observed
low educational attainments. The empirical analysis is inspired by the theoretical literature on
group inequality, which argues that a family living in a disadvantaged community can optimally
decide to invest relatively less in schooling when network externalities are in place (Bowles
& Sethi (2006)). The literature identi￿es two network externality mechanisms through which
segregation in enclaves can emerge endogenously that are relevant for this paper and are reviewed
below. The ￿rst draws on Benabou (1996)￿ s research on strati￿cation in the urban space, leading
2migrants to concentrate in neighborhoods less favorable to human capital investments. The
second argues that migrant families care about being accepted among members of their own
origin community, and that they might be willing to reduce their investments in human capital
to avoid the costs of exclusion.
I test the relevance of this network externality using unique data from Thailand, the Nang
Rong Project database. This dataset provides direct individual and family information on both
migrants and stayers, through longitudinal surveys in the villages and migrant follow-ups in
the main urban destinations. It also includes rich retrospective information on migration and
education decisions that allows me to work with a panel data set of individual location decisions
and schooling outcomes, from multiple communities and to multiple destinations, over a long
period of time. In contrast to the majority of contributions in the migration literature, I can
take advantage of this balanced representation of migrants and stayers to control for the fact
that those choosing to migrate and to join the migrant network at destination are not a random
sample of the rural young population.
I examine the role of networks on the schooling decision of young internal migrants, as higher
education is believed to be an important proxy for social mobility of migrants within the urban
labor market1. The young migrant￿ s network is measured by the number of sampled individuals
from his village who are located at his destination at each point in time. Identi￿cation of
network e⁄ects is based on the fact that each village has a di⁄erent history of migration so that
the rural young coming from di⁄erent villages rely on networks of contacts that are developed
di⁄erently2. The potential endogeneity of the network e⁄ect is controlled through instrumental
variable estimation extending the approach in Munshi (2003) to include the aggregation of
networks at the tiny village level. The network size variable is instrumented by the exogenous
source of variation associated with random, ballot-based, assignment of young to the military
service. The forced movement to the cities of the rural young men balloted to serve in the
military tends in fact to be accompanied by increased voluntary migration of these same young
and others villagers in later years. Additional instruments for network size are a proxy for
exposure of rice cultivators to rain variability, and a lagged measure of the incidence of return
migration to the village.
The estimates show that a larger network of co-villagers at destination lowers the probability
that a young migrant is enrolled in higher schooling. I interpret this result as an indication that
social interactions with the "origin" network matter in determining the migrant "long term"
1An increasing number of studies shows the importance of education for migrant assimilation and long-term
earning prospects. Yamauchi (2003), examining wage dynamics of migrants in Bangkok, shows evidence of a
complementarity between upon-arrival human capital and labor market experience at destination. His results
imply that more-educated migrants have higher learning e¢ ciency and can perform tasks of greater complexity,
ultimately yielding higher wage growth in the destination market. In the context of international migration, some
important contributions have shown that the source of human capital matters, the one acquired at destination
being more rentable on the labor market (see Friedberg (2000) and Eckstein & Weiss (1998))
2Thai villages were historically fairly tightly bounded social communities and traditional village life was rela-
tively isolated, generating a common community culture and encouraging behavioral conformity (Godley (2001)).
Of course, this static picture is evolving now with the increasing migration ￿ ows to the cities.
3pro￿le, in terms of willingness to acquire destination-speci￿c human capital and, possibly, in
terms of the speed at which he is able to converge to natives￿performances on the labor market.
The robustness of the results is con￿rmed when I shift to an alternative multinomial mixed logit
approach for the joint migration and education decisions, which accounts explicitly for individual
heterogeneity.
These ￿ndings suggest that network e⁄ects can act as a driving mechanism of low-mobility
traps among migrants. As a result, the important role networks play in facilitating migration
and easing life at destination might come at a cost, slowing down the convergence of people of
rural origin to the average level of skills of the urban born. Considering the strength of the links
migrants keep with their origin villages (by remittances, return episodes and as role models),
it cannot be excluded that this network e⁄ect on human capital might reinforce persistence in
inequality between backward rural areas and dynamic urban poles in developing countries.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the theoretical
literature on group segregation and educational investment. Section 3 describes the data and
the network measure used. Section 4 develops and reports on the econometric analysis. Section
5 concludes.
2 Social networks and schooling in the theory of segregation
2.1 Network spillovers and human capital inequality between groups
The implications of segregation for di⁄erential human capital accumulation and persistent in-
equality have been formalized by Bowles and Sethi (2006). In their model, the population is split
by birth in two distinct groups. Individuals have a preference for association with individuals
of their group, which is de￿ned as segregation. Such diversity in social network composition
translates into di⁄erent opportunity costs of human capital accumulation, as an externality is in
place linking each training achievement of a young with those of the other individuals to which
he is tied. Indeed, an increasing number of contributions in sociology and in economics show
that people coming from rural areas and urban born often constitute two very distinct groups
who behave di⁄erently in the city environment (see Mills, 1997).
Assume then that there is a higher proportion of skilled among natives than among migrants
coming to the city when internal migration starts gaining momentum, not a strong assumption
if one recognizes that skills acquired at the rural village are not fully transferable at destination.
Consistently with Bowles and Sethi (2006)￿ s framework, this initial inequality in the allocation
of skills between migrants and non migrants can be shown to widen and persist in time if
segregation is high enough. Persistent group inequality arises as a result of the social externality
in the costs of education, with no need to assume discrimination in the labor market or binding
liquidity constraints for education. These conclusions rule out one-shot redistributive policies
as e⁄ective instruments for equalization although the scope for intervention improves if one is
4willing to drop the assumption of an exogenously ￿xed level of segregation.
2.2 Why do networks externalities emerge? Residential enclaving and human
capital accumulation
One potential determinant of origin-biased social networking is the residential segmentation of
groups in city space. Think of the utility maximization problem faced by the adult as involving
also a location decision among two di⁄erent neighborhoods, each parent trading o⁄ the bene￿t
of a better environment for his child￿ s learning with the cost of higher rents. BØnabou (1996)
proves that location strati￿cation is generated endogenously (those from one speci￿c community
preferring to locate in one speci￿c neighborhood) as an equilibrium, if those rich in human capital
are able to bid more than the poor for living in the community with a higher endowment of
human capital. Formally, BØnabou￿ s sorting condition says that the marginal rate of substitution
between the network quality and the rent price increases with the parents￿level of education. If
this sorting condition holds, any divergence from the symmetric initial allocation of skill between
groups; sets in motion a cumulative process with skilled (higher income) people outbidding
unskilled (lower income) people for the privilege of locating close to other skilled people. When
translated to the issue of internal migration, this simply means that the migrants, starting from
a lower level of human capital, have on average less to bid in the trade-o⁄ between community
quality and rents, and end-up disproportionately in neighborhoods less favorable to human
capital investments. Segregation in the city space is a variable that can be a⁄ected by policy:
di⁄erentiated taxes and subsidies can be e⁄ective in reallocating families across communities
(BØnabou, 1996), and urban regeneration programs can raise the attractiveness of neighborhoods
where there is an historically higher concentration of migrants3.
2.3 Other Sources of network externalities: Social signalling and preference
for conformity
As spatial and social proximity are likely to be correlated, the allocation of individuals in strat-
i￿ed neighborhoods can alone generate segmentation. However, other mechanisms can explain
why migrants can rationally prefer to maintain segregated social relations. Consider ￿rst a
scenario in which a young person derives utility from being part of his origin group and admis-
sion to the group is selective. It seems reasonable to assume that migrants can diverge in the
value they assign to group participation and that the migrant community might preserve its
cohesion by excluding families signalling little interest in participation by "deviant" behaviors.
One of these behaviors can be an investment in the schooling progression of the young which is
3This issue is acknowledged by policy makers. The housing projects of the National Housing Authority (NHA)
and the Bangkok Metropolitan Administration (BMA) have engaged in ensuring some mix of housing at all price
range in each area. In addition, the Bangkok Plan addresses existing spatial disparities in the location of jobs and
housing, and encourages balanced jobs and housing growth in each of the city planning units (see Tapananont
(2004)).
5believed excessive by the group. One reason, among others, is that the school enrollment of the
young already able to work can make a migrant family temporarily unable to meet some social
obligations, like sending to the village a minimal amount of remittances. When the social type
is private knowledge then, con￿ icting incentives to invest in destination-speci￿c human capital
and to signal loyalty to the group can be a channel through which historical group di⁄erences
in human capital levels spill over into the next generation￿ s investment behavior4.
A related, but distinct, channel endogenously creating correlation between young and estab-
lished migrants￿ schooling choices is the youngs￿preference for conformity. The young can be
assumed to bear an utility cost when failing to conform to the level of education e⁄ort of the
group or to the status quo distribution of occupational choices. Blume & Jayaraman (2007)
present an overlapping generation model in which each generation￿ s young trades o⁄ e¢ ciency
gains from choosing the optimal occupation against the costs of failing to conform. When so-
cial ties are strong enough, conformity may lead to occupational segregation and increase the
prevalence of low-education traps for rural-urban migrants.
Anything altering the trade-o⁄ between income gains and the value of group participation
will a⁄ect the incidence of the network externality. For example, a productivity shift raising
wages perceived by the migrants on the market would raise the opportunity costs of community
participation and lower the proportion of those willing to sacri￿ce education for group accep-
tance. In the other direction, access to a larger community at destination can be expected to
increase the value of group participation, and thus the relevance of the externality on individual
schooling decisions.
3 Data and network measures
The Thai economy experienced a rapid development process in the period under study and a
substantial increase in internal migration ￿ ows during the period, with an average growth rate of
real GNP per capita of 5.7% per year between 1976 and 1996. However, the rural-urban divide
grew dramatically during the same period as the income Gini coe¢ cient rose from 0.44 in 1976
to 0.52 in 1996, a level even higher than the corresponding average for Latin America and the
Caribbean in the same year (Jeong (2005)).
Figure 1 shows the raw correlation between the intensity of migration and the education
level of the migrant population, using averages at the "changwat" level from multiple National
4A similar mechanism has been elegantly exposed by Austen-Smith & Fryer (2005) who develop a two-audience
signalling model in order to explain the phenomenon of ￿acting white￿ , according to which young blacks in the
US make a low e⁄ort in school so to reveal to their peer group that they are not mimicking whites. The group is
assumed to have interest only on individuals whose social type is high, having no direct concerns with such types￿
educational levels. In the their model, this is formalized by assuming a ￿xed, non negative, payo⁄ for the group
from rejecting any individual. This anthropomorphization of the community group is consistent with other studies
on social networking and under-development traps. Ho⁄ & Sen (2005) show that control mechanisms at disposal
of the peer network can generate a poverty trap when economic opportunities outside the origin community widen.
A study by Munshi & Rosenzweig (2003), with survey data from Bombay, shows that networks of lower caste
male channel boys into local language schools leading to traditional occupations, despite the substantially higher
returns to nontraditional occupations.
6Labor Force Survey data5. Interestingly, there is an indication that localities with an higher
concentration of migrants are also those hosting relatively less educated migrants.
INSERT ￿gure 1 HERE: Migration Density and Secondary Education of Migrants, by Chang-
wat
The data used in the empirical analysis come from a collection of research surveys of social,
economic and environmental change in the district of Nang Rong, historically one of the least-
developed parts of Thailand. The Nang Rong project dataset consists of three waves of data
collection - for the years 1984, 1994, 2000. A migrant follow-up survey was added to track a sam-
ple of migrants who had gone to one of the four following urban destinations: (1) metropolitan
Bangkok; (2) the Eastern Seaboard, a highly dynamic area comprising the two urban centers of
Rayong and Chonbury; (3) Korat, an important regional pole, and; (4) Buriram, the provincial
capital. The 2000 round builds on the previous data collection e⁄orts incorporating a geo-spatial
component in addition to the community, household, and migrant follow-up surveys. Moreover,
the 1994 and 2000 surveys undertook the innovative task to identify both social and kinship
networks among the residents, households and villages of Nang Rong.
The estimations mostly rely on the life-history sections of the 2000 data, collected on the
sample of individuals who are resident in Nang Rong at the time of the survey, and on the
sample of those residing in one of the major urban destinations at that time. Life history, or
retrospective, data provide long-term information on migration and schooling choices, yielding
an unbalanced panel with a minimum of one observation for those aged 13-year-old in 2000, to
a maximum of 8 observations for those aged 20-year-old or older in 2000. The analysis thus
extends to multiple cohorts of individuals, and cover a period of almost 30 years. As mentioned
in the introduction, the most salient aspect of these data comes from the merging of information
on migrants and non migrants, which provides a picture of the rural community not bounded
by the rural district and thus closer to its true, geographically mobile, con￿guration. Table 1
describes all the variables used in the study.
TABLE 1 HERE: List of variables
Previous research on migration and source communities has asked origin families to provide
information on members who migrated. However, there are limits to the level of detail and
to the quality of this indirect information. Of course, quality is also an issue for retrospective
data. There are reasons to suspect recall bias especially concerning individuals who are older
at the time of the 2000 survey, and thus have to reconstruct how they behaved in a distant
past. However, Nang Rong surveys provide an opportunity to examine data quality because
they contain repeated retrospective histories undertaken in two points in time, in 1994 and in
2000; a simple check of the matching of information provided by a subset of individuals present
in both survey con￿rm that quality is quite high6. Moreover, there is evidence that events that
5Changwats are the ￿rst level of Thailand￿ s administrative subdivisions. Normalized share of migrants over
total population are built using sample weights available in the Labor Force Surveys of the National Statistical
O¢ ce of Thailand.
6Comparing life histories data on the whole sample from the 1994 and 2000 survey, we obtain a positive match
7are highly salient to the respondent, like schooling and migration decisions, are better recalled
(Beckett et al. (1999)).
Network size (Net in the equations which follow) is de￿ned by counting, for each young
individual and each year, the number of co-villagers present at destination the year before7.
Excluded from the count are migration episodes due to serving in the military or as a monk.
The network measure is thus time varying, and speci￿c to each village-destination couple. As
already said, I assume that the village is the most relevant agora shaping social interactions
outside the family, ruling out the progressive integration among villages through trade, sharing
of equipment, and, most relevantly, seasonal mobility of laborers. I also exclude the members
of the family that migrated from the count of the network size assigned to each individual-year,
as we are mainly interested in testing the e⁄ect of acquaintances and transitory social relations.
Table 2 provides descriptive statistics on adults residing in Nang Rong (column 1), all the
migrants (column 2), with disaggregation by destination. Inspection reveals the following pat-
terns. Internal migration of women and men is similar, with the city of Khorat being the only
destination where male migrants are predominant. The average level of education of parents is
slightly higher for migrants than for non migrants, as well as the migrants￿mean educational
attainment. The average size of the migrant stock tends to be considerably higher, as expected,
in traditional destinations, such as Bangkok and the provincial capital of Buriram than in new
emerging poles such as cities in the Eastern Seaboard. At their ￿rst migration, movers rely
on an extensive support from their communities, ranging from hospitality (three out of four go
and live with others they know) to help them ￿nding a job or for setting an entrepreneurial
activity (61% received this kind of help). Migrants are also highly successful in ￿nding a job
at destination within one month from their arrival, and they tend to move in with friends or
family.
INSERT table 2 HERE: Descriptive Statistics
The last set of variables in the bottom three rows of the table gives a snapshot of the extent
of origin bias in social interactions. The whole pool of migrants reveal that, at the timing of
their ￿rst move, around 62% of their neighbors - people living between 100 meters where they
lived - came from the region of Isan, where Nang Rong is located. This percentage lowers only to
60% when migrants are asked about their location at the year of the survey, 2000. Considering
that between the year of the ￿rst move and the year 2000 there is an average interval of 11 years,
this suggests that residential mixing does not occur in this sample. Statistics on the origin of
friends at destination at the bottom of the table give similar indications.
Table 3 displays a transition matrix including information for all the young individuals whose
of answers on migration histories (whether one spent most of the time outside Nang Rong in a given year) around
86% of the times. In our ￿nal sample the percentage of positive matches is higher given that the average age is
lower (we keep information only on individuals for whom we have data on the previous generation).
7We chose to use a count with a one year lag for two reasons: the decision of whether to migrate is probably
taken with some months in advance the actual departure; moreover, with a lagged value of the network size, we
should partially reduce the simultaneity problem, according to which unobserved shock a⁄ect both the network
and the individual choices to migrate or to study.
8mobility and study choices are observed when between 13 and 25 years of age. It shows the
number of cases in which we observe a transition along one of the four states. The matrix reveals
that the sample has a fairly balanced representation of migrants and non migrants. Spotting the
number of unchanged states on the diagonal of the matrix shows that there is a relatively higher
number of cases of individuals studying as residents at Nang Rong than as migrants, suggesting
the possibility of a schooling dispersion associated to migration.
INSERT table 3 HERE: "Transition matrix for the joint schooling mobility choice"
4 Econometric models and results
The econometric identi￿cation of causal e⁄ects of networks on education outcomes poses complex
problems. As emphasized by Manski (1993), the fundamental problem with research on social
interactions is the necessity to control for correlated unobserved e⁄ects within the community.
The selection issue by which young migrants and stayers di⁄er along unobserved characteristics
is an additional complication. Our modelling approach in section 4.1 is similar to Mroz (1987):
it follows a three-step approach to control for both self-selection into migration of the young and
endogeneity of the network size. The bias due to the estimation on a selected sub-sample of the
young population is corrected by modelling, as a ￿rst stage, the endogenous choice of moving to
the city. A second step tackles the potential endogeneity of the network e⁄ect, by instrumenting
network size through the exogenous variations in the number of twenty-years-old males balloted
to serve in the military service and additional instruments. In the ￿nal step, the network e⁄ect
is identi￿ed by a structural equation for enrollment, including both the instrumented network
variable and the sample selection correction. The robustness of the results is checked in section
4.2 by estimating an alternative, multinomial optimization problem with endogeneity problems
handled by controlling for unobserved individual heterogeneity through simulation methods.
4.1 A three-step, binomial model correcting for self-selection and endogene-
ity
I discuss the methodology by tackling ￿rst the self-selection problem, then the endogeneity
problem. I display the results sequentially from the naive probit estimation on the migrant
subsample to our preferred speci￿cation, a structural model controlling for both self-selection
and endogeneity.
4.1.1 Step 1. Correction for self-selection into migration
We are interested in the education decision of the young once he has reached an urban desti-
nation. The critical assumption for identi￿cation of migrant network e⁄ects on this decision is
that the ￿ ow of young moving from rural to urban areas is sorted into groups according to their
village of origin. This sorting is however far from being a random assignment from the whole
pool of rural young. The availability of data on migrants and non-migrants allows to model
9explicitly the choice of migration as a pre-requisite for participation in group interactions. By
controlling for the non-randomness of the migration choice, I correct for the likely di⁄erences
between migrants and non migrants well acknowledged in the migration literature. The bias
associated with non-random sorting into migrant networks is further reduced by setting up a
simultaneous selection of migration destination and associated networks. Because of the di-
chotomy of the enrollment variable when treating the data as a pooled cross section, I follow
Van de Ven & Van Praag (1981) whose probit sample selection model is an extension of the
Heckman (1979) selection model for dichotomous outcome variables.
The binary enrollment equation for a young migrant i can be expressed in latent terms as
follows:
E￿
i = ￿0Xi + ￿0Neti + "i1 (1)
E￿
i can be interpreted as the expected utility gain from enrollment in school. In the notation
above, ￿0 is the main coe¢ cient of interest, expressing the impact on schooling enrollment of
variation in Neti the size of the network of co-villagers, not members of the origin family, present
at destination the year before the education decision is taken (NETWORK SIZE ); ￿ is a K ￿1
vector of parameters to be estimated and Xi is a K ￿ 1 vector of time varying and constant
exogenous variables, at the individual, family and village level. The vector of controls includes:
the gender of the young (MALE); his age in 2000 (AGE IN 2000); the number of younger
siblings (SIBLING); the average education of the parents (PARENTAL EDUCATION); family
wealth at origin (ASSET SCORE); the availability of a high school at the village of origin
(SCHOOL); whether more than one language is spoken at home (LANGUAGE); age dummies,
city destination and origin village ￿xed e⁄ects, time controls, and a constant term. The error
term is assumed to be normally distributed: "i1 ￿ N(0;￿2):
Assume a reservation destination exists for each rural-born individual. This latent variable,
expressing the expected utility gain from migrating, can be expressed as:
M￿
i = ￿0Ri + "i2 (2)
where the vector Ri includes the control variables in Xi; and the following additionnal vari-
ables: the total number of migrants from a village with one year lag (TOTAL NETWORK) and
a constant term. It also includes the following variables selected as exclusion restrictions: the
distance of the origin village from the main road to Nang Rong (ROAD LENGTH); a measure
of family migration experience (FAMILY MIGRATION); and a family level measure of exposure
to rain shocks at the origin (RAIN). The distance of the village from the main road is expected
to be negatively correlated with habitants￿capacity to leave. Information on and moving cost
of migration are expected to decrease with family long-term migration experience. In order to
reduce simultaneity concerns, the experience variable gives equal weight to the migration histo-
ries of all family members, and thus takes into account migration episodes far in the past (663
migration cases in the dataset refer to years before 1970). As shown in other studies of migra-
tion from rural areas in developing countries (see Munshi (2003) and Swee (2007)), scarce rains
10represent a serious shock to agricultural production - the culture of rice in this context - which
can induce further migration. Given that there is only one meteo station collecting rain data
for the whole Nang Rong region, the exposure index has been built by interacting the average
yearly volume of rain in the district with the time investment of family members in agricultural
activities8.
The population regression function in (1), for the subsample of migrants, can be stated as:
E(E￿
i j Xi) = ￿0Xi + E("i1 j Xi;Neti;M￿
i ￿ 0): (3)
The parametric assumption of the model is the bivariate standard normal distribution of "i1
and "i2 , with correlation coe¢ cient ￿: With this assumption, the error term in the outcome
equation has the following conditional distribution:
E("i1 j Xi;;Neti;M￿
i ￿ 0) = ￿￿i
where ￿it =
￿(￿Rit)
￿(Rit) ; and ￿;￿ are respectively the standard normal density and cumulative
distribution. As shown by Heckman (1979), the inverse Mill￿ s ratio term ￿ is a control function
that must be added to the outcome equation (1) in order to estimate consistently the parameters
￿ and ￿ :
E￿
i = ￿0Xi + ￿0Neti + ￿￿i + "i1 (4)












￿ and ￿ can be consistently estimated using the Heckman two step procedure, or by a full
maximum likelihood approach9. The enrollment equations are estimated on repeated annual
observations for 776 young individuals between 13 and 19 years old, yielding an unbalanced
panel of 2164 cases (one case corresponding to the pair individual-year). The selection equation
is estimated on a sample of 5961 observations referring to 1355 young.
The main variable of interest, the origin village migrant network size, has a statistically
signi￿cant negative impact on enrollment both in the benchmark probit model and in the probit
model corrected for migrant self-selection; this negative impact is con￿rmed when we control
for origin village ￿xed e⁄ects. Because of pooled data with t observations for each individual,
8Rain data come from the Thailand Meteorological O¢ ce, and cover all years starting 1970. The time in-
vestment in agriculture is computed by counting, for all adult family members, the number of years they spent
working as peasants, starting from the age of 13, and dividing this number by their age minus 13.
9I opt for the second one estimating the model through the heckprob command in STATA. See the STATA
reference manual (2007) for details on the command.
11standard errors need to be corrected for the likely intra-group (individual) correlation. This is
done through the cluster variance estimator (see STATA (2007)).
Results are displayed in table 4. Columns 1 and 2 ￿rst show results from a simple probit
model, not accounting for self selection into migrant status. Column 2 includes village ￿xed
e⁄ects so that the identi￿cation of the network e⁄ects relies on changes in migration investments
across communities while we control for ￿xed, unobserved characteristics of the communities.
Columns 3 and 4 display results for the same probit models once we control for self-selection
into migration.
INSERT table 4 here: "School enrolment model with selection into migration"
There is no strong evidence of gender e⁄ects either on the propensity to pursue higher
schooling or to migrate when young. Having educated parents raises the odds of being enrolled
in school after the age of 13, while being (weakly) negatively correlated with internal migration
of the young. Speaking more than one language at home has no signi￿cant e⁄ects on schooling,
while it is positively correlated with migration propensity: no one-way causal relation can be
established here, since the fact of speaking more than one language at home can be associated
with a family history of migration or interethnic marriages. In order to control for family wealth
while reducing evident endogeneity concerns, I build a principal component measure of family
long term income, condensing information on twelve productive and non productive assets. This
wealth measure has a signi￿cant, positive explanatory power on the odds of enrollment, while
it is not a signi￿cant determinant of young migration choices. Having more younger brothers
and sisters does not a⁄ect schooling choice once one has controlled for wealth, suggesting no
competition for scarce resources among siblings. However, coming from a larger family seems
to a⁄ect positively the willingness to migrate. With respect to those migrating to Bangkok,
enrollment rates are higher for the young who moved to Buriram (the regional capital).
As to the variables excluded for identi￿cation reasons, observe that the exposure to rain
variability, due to concentration of family activity in rice production, acts as an important push
factor for individual migration10. The overall migration investment of the village (obtained by
counting together migrants from the village present in all the destinations with one year lag
and weighting this measure by the sampled village population) is a highly relevant predictor
of individual migration. Finally, the cumulated number of years of working experience outside
Nang Rong of family members not in the estimation sample (30 years old or older), is another
important explanatory factor of the migration of the young.
A potential drawback to the application of Heckman￿ s selection model is its sensitivity to the
assumed parametric distribution of the unobservable error terms in the model. If the joint dis-
tribution of the error terms is misspeci￿ed, the second-step parameter estimator will,in general,
be inconsistent. Newey et al. (1990) conditions on a polynomial of the estimated probability of
participation in a regression framework, in order to avoid to impose parametric forms on error
10This has been shown convincingly for Nang Rong data by Swee (2007), who build a measure of exposure to
rain shock by interacting rain intensity with a estimated probability of being a net rice producer.
12distributions. This ￿ exible function of the estimated probability approximates the unknown
conditional expectation of the error term, just as the Mills ratio terms, which are functions of
the probability of participation, represent the conditional expectation of the unobservables un-
der the normality assumption. Table 4, column 5 reports the results when the selection model is
estimated semi-parametrically in two steps as suggested by Newey et al. (1990), using a quartic
in the predicted probability of migration to approximate the true control function: the statistical
signi￿cance and the size of the coe¢ cient for network size are not much altered11.
4.1.2 Step 2. Correction for endogeneity of the network size variable
Controlling for self-selection in the migration status is not enough to achieve consistent iden-
ti￿cation of network e⁄ects if we have reasons to suspect the endogeneity of the network size
variable in the individual schooling model. Three variations of the same statistical problem need
to be considered: measurement error, simultaneity bias and omitted variable bias. Essentially,
all three challenge the consistency of the model, pointing to the possibility that the network size
regressor can be correlated with unobserved determinants of the enrollment choice. Measure-
ment error is an issue, since we dispose of an imperfect proxy of the true size of the network
from the origin community: given that villages are not isolated from one another, and that soli-
darity or mutual recognition can link individuals at a higher level than the village, it is possible
that our variable measures the e⁄ective network with error. This error can be correlated with
unobserved characteristics of the young mediating the network e⁄ect, since less able individuals
might search for network connections outside their own origin village. Simultaneity bias can be
a further threat to the consistency of network e⁄ect estimation. The choice of youngsters to be
enrolled in school can be internalized by the community, which might then transfer information
on job opportunities in the city to those who are still in the village. By this mechanism, network
size might not only cause but also be in￿ uenced by schooling behavior. Finally, omitted variable
bias is probably the greatest source of concern, since we are not able to control for the full set of
unobserved factors and shocks a⁄ecting both movements from the villages to the cities and the
human capital accumulation of individuals who are part of this ￿ ow. In particular, unobserved
shocks in the return to schooling at destination can be associated with changes in the relative
pro￿tability for the young of joining a larger network. The following simultaneous estimation
helps deal with these issues:
E￿
i = ￿0Wi + ei = 0 (6)
11As stressed by Newey et al. (1990), this and other variants of semi-parametric estimators of the selection model
would require some mechanism to choose the amount of "smoothing" imposed (here number of basis functions).
I am not aware of any "rule of thumb" providing clear guidance on the length of the polynomial, and the quartic
function has been simply chosen after testing for signi￿cance of alternative control functions. Moreover, results of
the semi-parametric estimation of the selection model are only provided as a robustness check, since the two-step
estimation of binary response models is problematic: the likelihood in the second step is biased, and the extent
of the bias is proportional to the size of the correlation between the error terms of the two equations.
13Neti = ￿0Zi + ui (7)
where Wi = (Xi; d Neti); with Xi being the usual set of controls and d Net being the ￿tted
values from the network instrumented equation (7), i.e. d Neti = b ￿
0
Zi. The instruments in the
vector Zi are expected to satisfy the requirements of exogeneity and relevance.
The log likelihood for observation i is:
lnLi = Ei ln￿(mi) + (1 ￿ Ei)ln[1 ￿ ￿(mi)] + ln￿(
Neti ￿ ￿0Z
￿
) ￿ ln￿ (8)
with
mi =





The model is estimated using the IVProbit procedure in Stata which implements Amemiya￿ s
generalized least square estimator (Amemiya (1978); Newey (1987)), jointly estimating equations
(6) and (7) via maximum likelihood where endogenous variables are treated as linear functions
of their instruments as well as other exogenous variables. Standard errors are corrected for the
correlation induced by the fact that individuals are observed over multiple periods.The proposed
instruments in Zi are: 1) the proportion of young males (at the ages of 20-21) in the village
who are balloted to serve in the military outside Nang Rong (MILITARY); 2) the exposure of
the village to rain shocks (RAIN VOLUME); 3) the incidence of return migration to the village
(RETURN). Regarding recruitment into military service, it was by ballot in Thailand until 1998,
as the number of liable conscripts was far higher than the number needed by the armed forces12.
Call-up took place once a year and each district was given a quota for the number of recruits
needed by the armed forces. Eligible males had to participate in the ballot and those who drew
a red ticket had to perform military service, leaving the village of birth for up to two years.
The random departures of the young imposed by the ballot system are likely to represent
an external variation of information on living and working opportunities outside Nang Rong.
Inspection of the data in ￿gure 2 suggests that there is a signi￿cant correlation between the
stock of migrants in a given year and the number of young balloted for the military the year
before: migrant networks can be strenghtened directly by those young who choose not to go
back to the village when the conscription period has expired, or indirectly by the information
provided by conscripted movers to those considering the possibility to migrate. As is well known,
instrumental variables need to satisfy not only the requirement of relevance but also the one
of instrumental exogeneity: restricting the relevant sample to individuals who are 19 years old
or younger, we can believe that the randomized village-level participation of the young in the
12Conscription was introduced in Thailand shortly after the First World War. In the 80s and 90s the re-
cruitment system increasingly became subject to public debate. Obviously the system was likely to lead
to favoritism on the hands of in￿ uential or rich people. We expect this favoritism to be less pronounced
within the less developed rural areas of Nang Rong, and thus that young villagers had to face more or
less the same risk of being recruited for the military. See the military recruitment dataset at: http://leav-
www.army.mil/fmso/documents/mildat/RecruitmentCodebook.pdf
14military has no independent e⁄ects on schooling choice of the young not liable for serving in the
army.
INSERT ￿gure 2 HERE: Correlation Between Village Migration and Military Conscriptions
Regarding exposure to rainfall shocks, the village level measure is built by interacting the
level of rainfall with the village-level average time investment in agriculture. The exogeneity of
this second instrument can be reasonably assumed if we think that shocks at the origin village
have no other impact on schooling choices of young migrants in the city apart from altering the
size of their relevant network13.
The last instrument is a count of episodes of return from each destination to village of
origin: the relevance of this instrument is straightforward, as substantial episodes of return are
observable once the village starts to have a relevant migration history. I use a two-year lagged
value of this return variable to reduce the threat to validity represented by unobserved factors
or shocks likely to a⁄ect both village-level return behavior and individual schooling decisions at
destination. Again, the assumption here is that the schooling choices at destination of young
migrants are a⁄ected by returns of people outside their family only through the variation in size
of their community network.
4.1.3 Step 3. Structural model accounting for both self-selection and endogeneity
As both self-selection of the young as migrants and the endogeneity of the network variable are
deemed important for identi￿cation of the network e⁄ect, I propose a model able to account for
both problems by rewriting the outcome (eq. 1), the instrumenting (eq. 7) and the selection
(eq. 2) equations as a system:
Ei = 1(￿0Xi + ￿0Neti + "i1 > 0)
Neti = ￿0Zi + ui (10)
Mi = 1(￿0Ri + "i2 > 0)
allowing arbitrary correlation among the three error terms.
An estimating equation can be easily derived from the system:
Ei = 1[￿0Xi + ￿0Neti + g(Ri;Mi) + vi] > 0) (11)
where g(Ri;Mi) = E("i1 j Ri;Mi):
As shown by Mroz (1987), two stage least square (TSLS) estimation provides consistent
estimates of ￿ if at least two valid instruments are available14.
13The exogeneity of this second instrument can be challenged: if shocks at the origin alter demands of staying
villagers for support by their family migrants, then the need to remit more can explain a change in labour supply
of the young. However, this instrument is not crucial for acheiving identi￿cation, and it is excluded from all the
regressions with village ￿xed e⁄ects.
14The non linearity in the Mills ratio, estimated through probit, could provide identi￿cation even with a single
15INSERT table 5 HERE: "IV Estimation of network e⁄ects on schooling enrolment"
Results are displayed in table 5. Columns 1 and 2 are di⁄erent speci￿cations of the Amemiya-
Newey instrumental variable probit model, the second including village ￿xed e⁄ects. Columns
3 and 4 report TSLS (linearized) estimates, respectively with and without village ￿xed e⁄ects.
In all speci￿cations, network size enters as a negative and signi￿cant determinant of schooling
enrolment. Taken together with those in table 4, I interpret these results as strong support for
the hypothesis that young individuals, when migrating, have a lower propensity to acquire an
higher level of education if they are part of a large enclave.
Regarding the instrumental variables, the lagged number of drafted soldiers is strongly cor-
related with the size of the network in all the speci￿cations. The number of episodes of return
at period t ￿ 2 are a highly signi￿cant and positive predictor of the stock of migrants at any
destination at period t ￿ 1. Rain intensity, as expected, reduces out-migration from the village,
even if its statistical signi￿cance drops when we add village ￿xed e⁄ects to the model speci￿-
cation. This instrument becomes redundant given the collinearity with the ￿xed e⁄ects, so we
can omit it (column 4) and still meet the conditions for identi￿cation. In all the speci￿cations,
the combined instruments pass weak identi￿cation tests15. A test of overidentifying restrictions
shows that the null of instrument exogeneity can not be rejected (the Hansen J statistics for the
2SLS model with selectivity correction (4) has a value of 0.58, which corresponds to a P-value
of 0.45) .
Regarding the magnitude of the impact, a one standard deviation increase in network size
corresponds to a decrease in the probability of enrollment of 6.6% in the three-stage model
(column 4). It is interesting to observe that the size of the estimated e⁄ect doubles in the three-
stage model with respect to a simple linear probability model with village ￿xed e⁄ects. This
change could re￿ ect the role of unobservables. First, unobserved ability or taste for schooling
could be a relevant omitted variable. This unobservable is likely to be negatively correlated
with network size, as those with less ability would rationally choose destinations with larger
networks, thus biasing ￿0 in (5) downwards. Similarly, networks can become more dispersed
as unobserved shocks raise returns to schooling in urban areas. The fact that the benchmark
model cannot fully account for this endogenous network development could explain a downward
biased coe¢ cient16.
instrument. In practice, this is unlikely to work well because of collinearity problems, as explained in Wooldridge
(2002). It would be possible to estimate the model by partial maximum likelihood rather than with 2SLS, but
this would require strong assumptions on the joint distribution of the three error terms. Angrist (2001) argues
that the common use of parametric models overly complicates inference when the statistic of interest is causal
e⁄ects and suggests that linear approximation like standard 2SLS performs as well as parametric estimators in a
labor-supply model. A potential source of bias is given by the fact that we are including an estimated regressor,
the inverse Mills ratio. However, one cannot easily implement a standard error correction for two-stage models ￿
la Murphy and Topel, given the use of a cluster variance estimator.
15For the speci￿cation in (4), the Kleibergen-Paap Wald F-statistic has a value of 39.585, largely above the
critical values speci￿ed in Stock & Yogo (2005). This clearly indicates that the estimations do not su⁄er from the
weak instrument problem.
16Of course, here the discussion can not be easily generalized. In di⁄erent contexts, another framework can be
more appropriate, according to which migrants￿ ￿ ows increase when returns of schooling at destination increase.
16INSERT table 6 HERE: "Additional robustness checks":
Table 6 provides robustness check for the three-stage model above. Column 1 reports the
estimates of the same model on the larger sample of young between 13 and 25 years old. The
size of the network coe¢ cient decreases but it is still statistically signi￿cant. Column 2 shows
that the estimated network e⁄ect is not very sensitive to the inclusion of other time-varying
covariates at the village level: the mean education level of the network population, and the
average wage of covillagers at their ￿rst job at destination. Given their likely endogeneity, no
causal interpretation should be assigned to the coe¢ cients of these two additional regressors.
Finally, in column 3, migrants to the regional capital of Buriram are excluded from the sample.
Those migrating to this city might in fact face a di⁄erent assimilation process, given closeness
and lower ethnical diversity of this destination with respect to Nang Rong villages. As expected,
the statistical signi￿cance of the network variable increases.
4.2 Controlling for unobserved heterogeneity: a multinomial model for the
joint schooling and migration decisions
It is possible to control for unobserved heterogeneity by exploiting the availability of repeated
observations for each individual. Given that we dispose of data on both migrants and non
migrants, a convenient way of checking the robusteness of previous results is to rede￿ne the
model as a multinomial one. I restrict the focus to a particularly convenient class of multinomial
models, the mixed logit or logit Kernel model (Ben-Akiva et al. (2001), Prowse (2005)). Each
young i rationally chooses one of the four options j - de￿ned by the interaction of residential
status (migrant to an urban destination or stayer in Nang Rong) and enrollment choice (study
or work) - to maximize his payo⁄ V in each period t.
Migrate and Study : Vi;1;t = ￿0Xi1t + ￿0Neti1t￿1 + ￿i;1 + ￿i;1;t (12)
Migrate and Work : Vi;2;t = ￿0Xi2t + ￿0Neti2t￿1 + ￿i;2 + ￿i;2;t
Stay and Study : Vi;3;t = ￿0Xi2t + ￿0Neti2t￿1 + ￿i;3 + ￿i;3;t
Stay and work : Vi;4;t = ￿i;4;t
X is the vector of controls, Nett￿1 is the network variable and the fourth option Vi;4;t (Stay
in Nang Rong and Work) is chosen as the reference category, relative to which the parameters ￿
and ￿ in the ￿rst three equations are interpretable. The time invariant random e⁄ects (￿1;￿2;￿3)
are assumed to be jointly normally distributed with zero mean and covariance matrix ￿:
This speci￿cation endogenizes the location of residence decision with decisions in each period
about going to school, controlling for unobserved heterogeneity across individuals. Estimation
is carried out by maximum simulated likelihood. To understand the intuition behind this simu-
lation method, observe that the unconditional log-likelihood can be interpreted as an expected








exp(￿0Xi1t + ￿0Neti1t￿1 + ￿i;j)
P




Simulation proceeds by sampling R times from the distribution of ￿i and constructing joint
probability of the individual￿ s observed sequence Pi(￿r
i) for r = 1::::R: The individual simulated
likelihood are obtained by averaging Pi(￿r
i) over the R draws17. Results are displayed in table
7.
INSERT Table 7 HERE "Mixed Logit estimation of Network e⁄ects"
The ￿rst set of columns (1) reports the results with random intercepts, all other variables
having their coe¢ cients kept ￿xed. The second set of columns (2) allows for correlations and
heteroscedasticity in the within-period and between-period unobservables a⁄ecting the individ-
ual￿ s payo⁄s from each alternative18. As shown (see Prowse, 2005), this additional ￿ exibility
can be important as estimates of individual characteristics are sensitive to the assumed distrib-
ution of unobservables. The third set of columns (3) displays results of a ￿xed e⁄ect estimation
with uncorrelated random intercepts and the ￿nal set of columns (4) includes correlated ran-
dom intercepts and village ￿xed e⁄ects. Coe¢ cients need to be interpreted with respect to the
baseline alternative, staying in Nang Rong as a worker. For example, looking at the coe¢ cients
for family wealth (proxied by the asset score), one can see that those studying at destination
come from relatively wealthier families. Those migrating for working tend to have a less wealthy
background with respect to those who stay and ￿nd an employment in their origin region.
Concerning the network e⁄ect, there is evidence of a signi￿cant impact of the migrant network
size on preferences for employment or education for those leaving their village. The young with
a larger network tend to migrate and start working more at destination while they exhibit a
lower preference for moving and studying in the city. To have an intuition on the magnitude
of this e⁄ect, consider a discrete change in the network size in the model in columns (4): a
one standard deviation increase in the size of the network (a one third increase of individuals
present at destination) increases the probability of choosing the option of migrating and working
by 1,8%, while decreasing the probability of choosing to migrate and study by 3,9%, when these
two options are evaluated with respect to the baseline choice of staying in the origin village to
work. There is also a signi￿cant e⁄ect of network size on the choice of studying rather than
working while staying in Nang Rong. However, this estimated e⁄ect is very small (one standard
deviation change in network size a⁄ecting the relative probability of studying at origin by only
17Several simulation methods exist for sampling from the distribution of ￿i; we here use Halton draws, which
have been shown to provide an high level of accuracy for a relatively low computational time (Train (2000)). The
model is estimated on STATA using the mixlogit routine developed by Hole (2007).
18Heteroskedasticity in the random intercepts basically means that there are di⁄erent amounts of unobserved
variation in youngs￿preferences for the three alternatives (stay and study, migrate and study, migrate and work),
relative to the baseline of stay in Nang Rong for working. Similarly, correlation between the random unobservables
allows for positive or negative associations in youngs￿preferences for the three alternatives relative to the baseline.
This is a signi￿cant departure of the mixed multinomial model with respect to the standard multinomial logit
model, which su⁄ers, as known, from the independence from irrelevant alternatives property.
180,3%).
5 Conclusions
In developing countries, the divide between trapped rural regions and dynamic urban poles
has widened in recent years, and so location of birth persists to be an important predictor
of economic opportunities. Di⁄erent economic models have illustrated how this opportunity
gap is destined to shrink when mobility is not constrained by high migration costs. However,
this is clearly true only if labor markets at destination do not segmentate in niches separating
migrants from natives, and if migrants are perceived and behave at destination labor market
as the natives do. Common observation, and our data from Thailand, indicate that migrants
tend to concentrate in enclaves at destination, and networks as informal institutions have an
important role in smoothing assimilation to urban life, either by promoting solidarity and risk
sharing among their members, either by easing employment matching.
This paper has investigated the dynamic implications of the social ties linking young migrants
to their own community of origin with regard to their educational decision. Assuming that
higher and technical education is needed for talented individuals to reap the full opportunities
of booming cities, I argued that a simple test of network e⁄ects on economic mobility can be
undertaken by regressing network size (as a proxy for density of the community ties and for the
probability that networks are active and e⁄ective) on the probability of the young to be enrolled
as students at destination.
I implemented this test using a panel dataset which accurately describes migration and
career choices of both stayers and movers in Thailand. A three-step estimation method was
used to take advantage of the characteristics of the data set and correct for self-selection in the
migration choice and possible endogeneity of the network e⁄ect with community network sizes
being instrumented by the random variation of young men balloted into the military service. I
found a statistically signi￿cant negative relation linking young migrants￿schooling decision with
the size of the network of co-villagers present at destination. These results were upheld when
shifting to an alternative multinomial speci￿cation, which allows a straightforward accounting
of individual heterogeneity.
The paper thus provides evidence of a channel which can lead to persistence of low edu-
cational attainment for those born in rural areas. This ￿nding has important implications for
policies attempting to rise schooling participation: young migrants integrated in su¢ ciently
large enclaves might perceive a higher opportunity cost of schooling and will tend to join the
labor force earlier. Since migrant networks are not likely to lose in importance as rural urban
integration proceeds, there is the need to study better why the clustering in solidal networks
might undermine investment in education at destination.
Two explanations deserve mention. A ￿rst links the migrant network size with the devel-
opment of asymmetric or strati￿ed communities within the city. Given an initial disadvantage
19with respect to natives, young migrants end up living in less dynamic neighborhoods. Labor
market institutions speci￿c to these heterogenous communities - and in particular the word-
of-mouth mode of dissemination of information about scarce job opportunities - are likely to
play a role as individuals belonging in low skill networks develop lower expected returns to high
education acquisition (Anderberg & Andersson (2007)). According to the second explanation,
the community e⁄ectively discourages the acquisition of higher education by their members, as
this behavior is perceived as a deviation from the community￿ s social norms and is sanctioned.
A policy maker interested in raising educational achievements of the young migrants should
sensibly think about measures a⁄ecting the community evaluation of higher schooling, such as
reserving preferential access of migrants to training and matching programs. It might also be
worth experimenting with policy measures reducing the dependency of young individuals on
support of their own origin community (for example, scholarship schemes involving the physical
deplacement of the young to neighborhoods where concentration of their co-villagers is lower).
Evaluations of programs providing transfers to randomly selected families in disadvantaged
neighborhoods to move to more a› uent areas show signi￿cant improvement in outcomes for
the young (see, for example, Kling et al. (2005)). One can further surmise that what holds
for internal migration is potentially even more valid for international migration as the value
attached by an individual to participation in his community group should rise as the costs of
migration and assimilation rise.
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number of drafted soldiers
95% CI Fitted values
Based on Nang Rong Project life-history data 1950-2000.
Migration & Drafted Military
  
Table 1. List of variables  
Variable Description 
                                                      Dependent variables 
Student   1=Enrolled as student, 0= Not Enrolled  
Migrant  1=Living in a urban destination, 0= Living in a Nang Rong Village 
  
                   Main explanatory variables  
Network Size  Number of year/destination/village specific established migrants. In all regressions it is 
computed with one year lag. For each young, migrants from his own family are excluded 
from the count 
Total Network   Number of year/village specific established migrants, divided by the total sampled village 
population.  In all regressions it is computed with one year lag. For each  young, migrants 
from his own family are excluded from the count 
Family Migration  Family average of adult – 30 year-old of older - individual migration histories (years spent 
outside Nang Rong/years of adult life(14 years old or more)) 
Network’s education  Destination/village specific average of years of education completed by established 
migrants. Computed with one year lag.   
Road length  Distance in kilometres of the origin village from the main road to the town of Nang Rong in 
1984 
                  Instrumental variables  
Military  Number of drafted soldiers who left the village, inserted in all regressions with two years 
lag 
Rain volume   Year average of monthly measures (in ml) of rain fallen in Nang Rong, interacted with 
averages (at village or household levels) of labor supply in agriculture (years spent 
working in agriculture /years of adult life (14 years old or more)). 
Return   Number of Individuals returning to the village from one urban destination, inserted in all 
regressions with two years lag.  
 
 
                 
                Main control variables  
Actual age   Age of the young at each period of the panel 
Age in 2000  Age of the young when interviewed for the 2000 survey 
Buriram  0= young lives in Buriram province, 1=young does not live in Buriram province 
Eastern Seaboard  0= young lives in Rayong or Chanbury, 1=young does not live in  Rayong or Chanbury  
Khorat  0= young lives in Khorat, 1=young does not live in  Khorat 
Language  0= more than one language is spoken at home, 1= only one language is spoken at home 
Male 0=female,  1=male 
Other destination  0= young does not live in any Thai destination other than Bangkok, Khorat, Eastern 
Seaboard or Buriram at a given age; 1=young lives in another destination  
Parental education  Average years of formal education completed by the parents. Years of education 
completed by the father (the mother), if only information on the father (the mother) is 
available 
  
Siblings  Number of living younger brothers and sisters 
School  1 = there is a secondary school in origin village in the relevant year; 0= there is no such 
school in origin village 
Single  0= married; 1= not married 
Asset score   Principal component wealth score obtained by using 1984 data on origin family’s 
ownership of the following assets:   television,  recorder,  telephone, refrigerator, 
computer, washing machine, motorcycle, car and  truck,  extension of plots cultivated. 
Average Wage  Deflated village-level average of salaries of migrants’ at their first job at destination 
                  Other descriptive variables 
Salary  Deflated migrant’s hourly wages (in bath) at first migration 
Support  1= migrant received help to find a job or to set up an entrepreneurial activity by family or 
friends, at his first migration; 0= migrant did not receive this help 
Education completed  Years of formal schooling completed 
Family at destination  1= migrant has family members present at destination at the time of his first migration, 
0=no family members present 
Money received  Money (in bath) received from origin family during the first migration year 
Money sent  Money (in bath) sent to the family in the village during the first migration year 
Others came  1 = migrant moved with others at his first migration, 2=migrant moved alone 
Others living  1 =migrant lived with family or friends at first migration, 0= migrant lived with no family or 
friends at his first migration 
Job in 1 month  1 = migrant found a job within 1 month at first migration, 0=migrant did not find a job in 1 
month  
Education completed  Years of formal schooling completed 
Neighbours from Isan  Percentage of neighbour coming from Isan for migrants in 2000. First refers to first 
migration and now to the year 2000  Table 2. Descriptive Statistics  
 
    Nang Rong  All migrants Bangkok Khorat East seabord  Buriram Others
Age in 2000*  mean  25.62  26.21 25.97 27.71 24.88  26.78 26.42
       5,21  4.55 4.30 5.71  4.58  5.32 4.54
Male* mean  0.54  0.49 0.47 0.60  0.52  0.52 0.47
      sd 0.50  0.50 0.50 0.49  0.50  0.50 0.50
Single* mean  0.40  0.35 0.41 0.38  0.46  0.30 0.29
      sd 0.49  0.48 0.49 0.49  0.50  0.46 0.45
Parental Education*  mean  8.79 8.88 8.80 9.18  8.92  9.74 8.75
      sd 4.03  4.05 3.88 4.02  3.98  5.31 3.78
Education completed*  mean  6.33 6.39 5.79 6.67  5.13  8.48 7.02
      sd 3.37  3.72 3.29 3.74  2.59  4.01 4.23
Asset Score*  mean  0.19  0.16 0.12 0.11 0.18  0.26 0.09
      sd 1.34  1.44 1.31 1.39  1.43  1.93 1.44
Siblings* mean  0.12  1.08 1.09 0.86 1.47  1.01 1.07
      sd 0.67  2.06 2.14 1.95  2.29  1.80 1.98
Road Length**  mean  5.65  5.27 5.47 5.58 5.79  5.58 4.95
      sd 3.30  3.11 3.23 3.08  3.21  3.10 2.96
Network*** mean   48.39 63.31 5.86 11.86  34.13 48.51
      sd   30.83 30.22 3.78  10.17  19.46 25.47
Family at destination***  mean   1.36 1.32 0.54  1.08  0.83 1.26
      sd   1.06 1.13 0.73  1.05  0.86 1.14
Return*** mean    4.51 5.29 3.22  2.82  3.49 4.65
      sd   7.16 7.60 6.42  5.78  6.94 7.00
Salary** mean    12.53 12.07 13.94  14.12  12.95 11.96
      sd   12.53 11.91 8.20  9.49  10.17 14.48
Money received**  mean    3.88 3.29 3.44  4.09  4.45 4.22
      sd   1.89 1.59 2.40  1.74  2.02 1.99
Money sent**  mean    4.54 4.62 4.56 4.51  4.87 4.17
      sd   1.47 1.41 1.67  1.66  1.40 1.55
Others came**  mean    0.62 0.64 0.69 0.60  0.54 0.61
      sd   0.48 0.48 0.47  0.49  0.50 0.49
Others living**  mean    0.73 0.75 0.68 0.68  0.60 0.76
      sd   0.45 0.43 0.47  0.47  0.49 0.43
Support** mean    0.61 0.67 0.60 0.56  0.34 0.66
      sd   0.49 0.47 0.49  0.50  0.47 0.47
Job in 1 month**  mean    0.88 0.88 0.69  0.88  0.93 0.76
  sd   0.33 0.33 0.47  0.33  0.25 0.43
Isan Neighbours first**   mean    62.17 60.78 64.72  70.97  54.54 63.61
  sd    30.46 31.16 26.19 28.65  31.42 29.28
Isan Neighbours now**  mean    60.33 60.05 64.71  56.69  58.72 60.84
  sd    31.73 31.92 32.00 34.14  30.62 31.34
Isan friends now**  mean    67.36 66.83 63.18  65.17  63.61 67.44
  sd    39.48 40.12 41.69 38.15  42.14 38.66
 
Note: *Statistics refer to individuals retained in the estimation sample, migrants or stayers in Nang Rong during the 2000 
survey (those for which life histories for the age 13-25 are not missing). 
** Statistics refer to pooled data from the Nang Rong migrant follow-up data in 1994 and 2000 surveys. 
*** Statistics are authors’ computations using pooled life history data from both the 2000 Nang Rong resident and the 2000 
























Table 3. Transition Matrix for joint mobility and study choices (13-25 years old / all cohorts) 
 
    Stay and Work 
 
Stay and Study  Migrate and Work Migrate  and  Study 


































Note: Author’s calculations on sample extracted from Nang Rong life history data for 2000; the numbers on 
the diagonal indicate the cases of no changes in status from one year to the following in the panel. Outside 
the diagonal are the cases of transitions from the state indicated in the first column at one year, to the state 
indicated in the first line at the following year (for example, in our sample there have been 414 cases of 
transitions from the state of residence in Nang Rong as a student (Stay and Study) to the state of residence 



































Dependent variable  Student  Student  Student Migrant  Student  Migrant  Student 
Network Size/10  -0.05b  -0.07a  -0.04c   -0.07a   -0.08a 
   [0.02]  [0.03]  [0.03]    [0.02]    [0.03] 
Total  network        1.29a  1.93a   
         [0.16]    [0.20]   
Family  migration        1.01a  0.95a   
         [0.20]    [0.20]   
Rain volume (family)        -0.91a    -1.07a   
         [0.33]    [0.28]   
Road  Lenght       -0.04a      
       [0.01]      
Age in 2000  0.02  0.02  0.01  -0.01  0.001  0.001  0.1 
   [0.04]  [0.05]  [0.08]  [0.04] [0.08] [0.04]  [0.11] 
Male  0.02  0.02 0.01  -0.07 0.04 -0.09  0.07 
   [0.16]  [0.16]  [0.16]  [0.07] [0.15] [0.07]  [0.17] 
Single  0.68a  0.80a 0.63b  -0.27a 0.82a -0.28a  0.88a 
   [0.16]  [0.17]  [0.25]  [0.07] [0.16] [0.07]  [0.18] 
Parental education  0.18a  0.21a  0.18a -0.02c  0.20a  -0.01  0.21a 
   [0.03]  [0.03]  [0.04]  [0.01] [0.03] [0.01]  [0.03] 
Siblings 0.01  0.01  0.02  0.08a  -0.01  0.08a  -0.02 
   [0.03]  [0.03]  [0.04]  [0.02] [0.03] [0.02]  [0.09] 
Language -0.04  -0.15  -0.01  0.24a -0.19 0.15c  -0.38 
   [0.20]  [0.23]  [0.22]  [0.08] [0.22] [0.09]  [0.27] 
Asset score  0.18a  0.19°  0.18a -0.04  0.19a  -0.04  0.25a 
   [0.05]  [0.06]  [0.06]  [0.03] [0.05] [0.03]  [0.06] 
School -0.09  -0.49  -0.09    -0.47    -0.59 
   [0.20]  [0.42]  [0.20]    [0.39]    [0.42] 
Eastern Seaboard  -0.32  -0.41 -0.29    -0.42    -0.56 
   [0.31]  [0.35]  [0.32]    [0.33]    [0.37] 
Khorat 0.27  0.26  0.28    0.22    0.27 
   [0.20]  [0.19]  [0.20]    [0.18]    [0.21] 
Buriram  1.11a  1.16a  1.11a   1.05a   1.19a 
   [0.22]  [0.21]  [0.22]    [0.21]    [0.22] 
Pr(out)           23.83b 
           [ 9 . 4 2 ]  
Pr(out)
2           -45.65 
           [29.89] 
Pr(out)
3           43.47 
           [41.41] 
Pr(out)
4           -18.22 
           [20.58] 
Time  fixed  effects Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes  Yes 
Age  fixed  effects  Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes  Yes 
Village fixed effects  No  Yes  No  No  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Constant -3.33b  -4.27a  -3.32  -0.62 -2.83 -1.05  -10.30b 
 [1.46]  [1.60]  [2.86]  [1.40] [2.86] [1.47]  [4.38] 
Observations  2164  2089 2164  5961 2164 5961  2084 
Log Pseudolikelihood  -461.62  -417.36  -3890.44  -3773.94  -396.36 
Robust standard errors in brackets, corrected for intra-cluster correlation at the individual level 
c significant at 10%; b significant at 5%; a significant at 1%.  
Note: In column 3 and 4 the bivariate probit model is estimated by full maximum likelihood, using the heckprob 
command in STATA. Semi-parametric in column 5 refers to the estimation method suggested in Newey et al.(1990), 




















2SLS with selection 
(4)  
Dependent  variable  Student Network Student Network Student Network Student  Network 
Network  size/10  -0.15a  -0.17a  -0.02c  -0.02c   
    [0.05]  [0.06]  [0.01]  [0.01]   
Military   0.36a  0.14a  0.14a   0.14a 
     [0.05]  [0.05]  [0.04]   [0.04] 
Rain volume (village)    -4.04a             
     [1.43]            
Return   0.11a  0.09a  0.09a   0.09a 
     [0.01]  [0.01]  [0.01]   [0.01] 
Selection  (IMR)         -0.29a  -1.46a 
           [0.09]  [0.44] 
Road  Lenght    -0.08a         
   [0.03]            
Age in 2000  0.01  0.001  0.01  0.08 0.001 0.08  0.02  0.15 
    [0.07] [0.06] [0.07] [0.07] [0.01] [0.06] [0.01]  [0.06] 
Male  0.03 0.14 0.02 0.04  0.001  0.06 0.01  0.11 
    [0.15] [0.19] [0.15] [0.16] [0.02] [0.10] [0.02]  [0.10] 
Single  0.64a -0.16 -0.11 0.76a  0.08a -0.1 0.10a  0.02 
    [0.16] [0.20] [0.16] [0.16] [0.02] [0.11] [0.02]  [0.11] 
Parental education  0.18a  -0.01 -0.01 0.20a  0.03a  0  0.02a  -0.01 
    [0.03] [0.03] [0.03] [0.03] [0.00] [0.01] [0.00]  [0.01] 
Siblings  0.01 0.001 0.01  0.02 0.001 0.02 -0.02a -0.08b 
    [0.03] [0.03] [0.03] [0.03] [0.00] [0.02] [0.01]  [0.04] 
Language -0.05  0.23  -0.18  -0.24  -0.04 -0.26c  -0.06b  -0.41b 
    [0.20] [0.25] [0.23] [0.23] [0.02] [0.13] [0.03]  [0.14] 
Asset score  0.18a  0.02  -0.12  0.17a 0.04a -0.11a 0.05a  -0.07c 
    [0.05] [0.09] [0.08] [0.05] [0.01] [0.04] [0.01]  [0.04] 
School  -0.13 -0.1 -0.53  -0.54  -0.06  -0.54c  -0.07 -0.57c 
    [0.20] [0.31] [0.40] [0.64] [0.07] [0.30] [0.07]  [0.30] 
Eastern Seaboard  -0.74b  -4.37a  -0.81b  -3.94a -0.08c -3.98a -0.10c  -4.00a 
    [0.34] [0.22] [0.40] [0.24] [0.05] [0.17] [0.05]  [0.17] 
Khorat  0.04 -2.23a 0.03 -2.07a 0.01 -2.09a 0.01  -2.09a 
    [0.20] [0.23] [0.22] [0.19] [0.03] [0.11] [0.03]  [0.11] 
Buriram 0.76a  -3.18a  -2.82a  0.83a 0.23a -2.83a 0.23a  -2.85a 
    [0.26] [0.27] [0.30] [0.29] [0.05] [0.16] [0.05]  [0.11] 
Time fixed effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Age fixed effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Village fixed effects  No  No  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Constant  -2.42 4.94b -3.09 2.9  0.002  2.8 -0.14  2.02 
    [2.93] [2.41] [2.86] [0.15] [0.36] [2.17] [0.34]  [2.18] 
Observations 2164 2089 2164  2164 
Log  Pseudolikelihood  -5550.18  -4934.51       
R squared 
       0.36  0.55  0.37  0.56 
Robust standard errors in bracket, corrected for intra-cluster correlation at the individual level 
c significant at 10%; b significant at 5%; a significant at 1% 
Note: The estimation method in column (1) and (2) is the Newey (1987) Amemiya (1978) instrumental variable probit. 
In column (3) and (4) the model is estimated through two stage least squares; in column (4) the inverse mills ratio 










2SLS with selection 
(1) 
2SLS with selection 
(2) 
2SLS with selection 
(3) 
         
Dependent variable  student  network  student network student network 
Network  size/10  -0.01b  -0.02c  -0.02b  
    [0.01]  [0.01]  [0.01]  
Military   0.11a  0.09b  0.14a 
     [0.02]  [0.04]  [0.04] 
Rain volume 
(village)        
     [0.80]  [1.38]  [1.39] 
Return   0.10a  0.06°  0.09a 
     [0.00]  [0.01]  [0.01] 
Selection (IMR)  -0.12b  -1.57a  -0.28a -0.93b -0.14c -1.35a 
  [0.06] [0.27] [0.09] [0.45] [0.08] [0.46] 
Age in 2000  0.01c  0.15a  0.02c  0.15b  0.01  0.11 
    [0.01] [0.03] [0.01] [0.06] [0.01] [0.07] 
Male  0.01 0.06 0.02 0.13 -0.01 0.08 
    [0.01] [0.06] [0.02] [0.10] [0.02] [0.10] 
Single  0.08a -0.02 0.10a 0.001 0.05a -0.01 
    [0.01] [0.07] [0.02] [0.12] [0.02] [0.12] 
Parental education  0.01a  -0.03a  0.02a -0.01 0.02a -0.02 
    [0.00] [0.01] [0.00] [0.02] [0.00] [0.02] 
Siblings  0.001 -0.07a -0.01b -0.06c -0.01c -0.08b 
    [0.001]  [0.02] [0.01] [0.04] [0.01] [0.04] 
Language -0.01  -0.16c  -0.07b  -0.33b  -0.04  -0.37b 
    [0.02] [0.08] [0.03] [0.15] [0.02] [0.15] 
Asset score  0.03a  -0.05b  0.05a -0.09b 0.04a  -0.01 
    [0.01] [0.02] [0.01] [0.04] [0.01] [0.04] 
School 0.02  -0.14  -0.07  -0.56c  -0.02  -0.81b 
    [0.04] [0.17] [0.07] [0.29] [0.07] [0.31] 
Eastern Seaboard  -0.06b  -3.99a  -0.11c -3.85a -0.12b -3.89a 
    [0.03] [0.10] [0.06] [0.17] [0.05] [0.17] 
Khorat 0.02  -1.93a  -0.01 -2.00a -0.01 -2.07a 
    [0.02] [0.07] [0.04] [0.11] [0.03] [0.11] 
Buriram  0.15a -2.54a 0.23a -2.98a     
    [0.03] [0.09] [0.06] [0.17]     
Average  wages     -0.001b  0.001    
     [0.0007]  [0.01]    
Network  education     -0.001  -0.15a    
     [0.002]  [0.01]    
Time  fixed  effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Age  fixed  effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Village  fixed  effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant -0.08  1.73  3.03 3.03 -0.08  4.16c 
  [0.21] [1.29] [0.39] [2.28] [0.31] [2.42] 
Observations  5603  1914  1892  
R  squared        
Robust standard errors in brackets corrected for intra-cluster correlation at the individual level 
c significant at 10%; b significant at 5%; a significant at 1%.  
Note: the model is estimated through two stage least squares;  the inverse mills ratio computed from 
a probit estimation of the migration model (see column 2, table 5), is included following Mroz (1987). 
        
        
 
 
 Table 7. Multinomial mixed logit models for migration and schooling status  
























Network Size  -0.03a -0.01b  0.01a -0.03a -0.01c  0.01a  -0.03a -0.01c 0.01a  -0.03a -0.01b 0.01a 
 [0.01] [0.01]  [0.00]  [0.01] [0.01] [0.00]  [0.01] [0.01]  [0.00] [0.01] [0.01]  [0.00] 
Male 0.03 -0.71  -0.11  0.09 -0.1  -0.27 -0.45 -0.35  -0.24  0.57 0.80c  -0.23 
 [0.63] [0.68]  [0.24]  [0.74] [0.53] [0.35]  [1.45] [0.50]  [0.21] [0.48] [0.45]  [0.20] 
Age in 2000  0.07 -0.3  0.24a  0.14 -0.23 0.24a  0.04 -0.24  0.24a -0.04 -0.05a  -0.03a 
 [0.55] [0.19]  [0.07]  [0.20] [0.17] [0.08]  [0.15] [0.20]  [0.07] [0.03] [0.02]  [0.00] 
Actual Age  -0.49 2.06a  1.30a  -0.8 1.34b  1.27a -0.67 2.01a  1.28a 0.02 -0.05  0.24a 
 [1.27] [0.57]  [0.17]  [1.00] [0.54] [0.18]  [0.96] [0.55]  [0.17] [0.14] [0.16]  [0.07] 
Actual Age squared  -0.04 -0.06a  -0.03a  -0.03 -0.05a -0.03a  -0.04 -0.06a -0.03a  0.85a 0.17a  0.78a 
 [0.03] [0.01]  [0.00]  [0.03] [0.01] [0.00]  [0.03] [0.01]  [0.00] [0.09] [0.03]  [0.08] 
Parental education  0.81a 0.13a 0.56a  0.79a 0.13c 0.67a  0.94a 0.13a  0.66a 0.76a 0.71a  0.89a 
 [0.12] [0.05]  [0.12]  [0.12] [0.08] [0.13]  [0.09] [0.03]  [0.11] [0.14] [0.10]  [0.12] 
Siblings 0.61a 0.66a  0.76a 0.74a 0.74a  0.88a  0.81a 0.68a 0.76a  -0.45 1.36b  1.28a 
 [0.15] [0.12]  [0.15]  [0.15] [0.10] [0.13]  [0.13] [0.10]  [0.13] [1.03] [0.56]  [0.18] 
Asset  score  -0.05 0.22a -0.23b  0.2 0.40b -0.27 -0.05 0.19c  -0.22a 0.26c 0.24a  -0.36a 
 [0.47] [0.08]  [0.11]  [0.24] [0.19] [0.17]  [0.15] [0.11]  [0.08] [0.13] [0.08]  [0.09] 
Random intercept  -3.11 -16.17b  -25.27a  -4.52 -24.47a  -14.21c -5.19 -19.85a  -23.82a -3.14 -19.93a  -25.28a 
 [13.55] [6.78]  [2.53]  [8.78] [3.40] [7.87]  [8.66] [6.89] [2.34]  [8.13] [6.58] [2.34] 
Standard Deviation  6.09a 4.24a 3.41a  7.13a 5.96a 3.59a 6.68a 4.82a  3.48a 6.55a 5.32a  3.51a 
 [0.79] [0.57]  [0.17]  [0.63] [0.55] [0.15]  [0.63] [0.48]  [0.16] [0.70] [0.59]  [0.16] 
Σ(1,1)         
         
Σ(2,1)         
         
Σ(3,1)         
         
Σ(2,2)         
         
Σ(3,2)         
         
Σ(3,3)         

























Time fixed effects 



















Robust standard errors in brackets. c significant at 10%; b significant at 5%; a significant at 1% 
Estimation method is mixed logit by maximum simulated likelihood, with 100 Halton draws. “Standard Deviation” refers to the standard deviation of the estimated random intercepts. In estimations (2) 
and (4), correlations and heteroscedasticity in the unobservables are allowed, and Σ (.,.) indicates the covariance matrix of the correlated random intercepts. 